MINING SURPLUS: MODELING JAMES A. SCHMITZ’S LINK BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVITY*  

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James A. Schmitz documents, in a well-known case study (Journal of Political Economy 113 (2005), 582–625), a dramatic rise in productivity in the American and Canadian iron-ore industry following an increase in competition from Brazil. Prior to the increased competition, the industry was not competitive. Economic profits were divided between business and unions. Schmitz attributes the increase in productivity to a change in work practices in the industry, as old negotiated union work rules were abandoned or modified. This research formalizes a mechanism through which a rise in competition can lead to increased productivity in the iron-ore industry.

1. INTRODUCTION

In a thought-provoking case study, James A. Schmitz documents how an increase in competition in the American and Canadian iron-ore industries, due to the entrance of Brazilian ore, led to large increases in productivity. The story is striking. Over the course of a few years, increased competition caused prices in the iron-ore industry to fall by 51%. Although output initially fell by some 30%, it quickly returned to 92% of its precrisis level. Real wages fell by 7%, but by 17% relative to precrisis trend. Simultaneously, labor productivity rose by 68%, and measures of total factor productivity (TFP) moved up by 42%. In short, greater competition in the market for iron ore boosted productivity. 2 Schmitz systematically details that these changes were not due to standard reasons, such as adopting new technology or closing inefficient mines, but rather due to reducing overstaffing and loosening workplace rules. The new and old work practices were the result of negotiations between mines and unions.

James A. Schmitz ends with a question: If workplace rules and overstaffing led to lower productivity, why were they implemented in the first place? Simply put, why would a firm choose to be unproductive? A simple model is presented here to answer this question. These firms were experiencing economic profits due to a lack of competition. The mines faced a unionized workforce. Unions have preferences both over the size of their membership and the

*Manuscript received September 2016; revised July 2017.
1 The authors thank Jim Schmitz for kindly supplying the data for this case study as well as some source material on the union contracts in the mining industry and various references to the literature. Three referees also provided useful comments. Please address correspondence to: David Weiss, The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, P.O.B. 39040, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel. Phone: 972 58-483-3163. Fax: 972 03-640-9583. E-mail: davidweiss@post.tau.ac.il.
2 The statistics presented here are for the Canadian iron-ore industry. See Appendix A.1 for a discussion of the data. The experience and statistics for the U.S. industry are very similar. One difference between the two countries is that Canada produces a measure for TFP whereas the United States does not. This explains the focus on Canada here.
utility of their members. The utility of a member is captured both by the wages they earn and workplace practices, which dictate how much effort they must expend on the job. The economic profits from mines are split between the firm and unions. When competition increases, these profits shrink. This leads to a reduction in membership (featherbedding or overstaffing). At the same time, union members exert more effort (due to more efficient workplace rules). Productivity increases.

Any story that attempts to explain Schmitz’s (2005) observations is confronted with an issue. If there are productivity and output gains to be had from changing workplace rules, then why would firms and unions “leave money on the table?” That is, why could they not reach a mutually beneficial agreement to take advantage of potential efficiency gains? In the model presented, this issue is resolved by assuming Nash bargaining between the firm and union. Thus, the allocation achieved in the model is bilaterally efficient, but not efficient from an economy-wide perspective. Essentially, the union is stripping the firm of part of its monopoly profits and redistributing them toward workers in the form of higher wages and better working conditions. It is also usurping part of the surplus realized from the firm’s operations to increase employment or membership; a union member may not be in favor of this. Clearly, the owners of the firms suffer from a loss of profits. The rest of the economy picks up the tab for such firm-cum-union monopoly practices. Competition leads to rising productivity because there are less economic profits to redistribute.

Bridgman (2015) also models the problem of a union facing a monopoly firm. He formulates workplace rules as a simple fixed cost in terms of employment. The union has lexicographical preferences; it cares only about employment when it lies below some fixed level and only about wages when employment lies above the fixed level. The union picks this fixed cost (which operates to increase employment) and wages to maximize these preferences, taking as given the monopolist’s demand for labor. All choices are unilateral with no negotiation. By contrast, in the current setting the firm and union bargain over effort, employment, and wages in a bilaterally efficient manner, subject to a technologically determined trade-off in production between the effort by a worker and the number of workers employed. The current framework is explicitly taken to the facts presented in Schmitz’s (2005) case study to see if it can provide a plausible mechanism for the story he relates.

Schmitz’s (2005) case study is important. It suggests that the cost of unions may be larger than a simple Rees (1963) welfare-loss triangle, which computes the deadweight loss that arises from the fact that unionized wages are higher than nonunionized ones. Unions may have a deleterious impact on productivity. There is now a growing literature on the connection between productivity and competition. Holmes and Schmitz (2010) survey the literature on case studies concerning the impact of competition on productivity in particular industries and discuss mechanisms by which competition affects productivity. One paper that looks at the macroeconomic effects of competition on productivity is Cole and Ohanian (2004). They show how the National Industrial Recovery Act led to a symbiotic relationship arising between firms and unions. Profits and wages in some industries soared, despite the fact that the economy at large was suffering through the Great Depression. Cole et al. (2005) study Latin America and provide evidence that anticompetitive policies, instead of differences in human capital or other factors, are the main reasons for low productivity in Latin American countries. Parente and Prescott (1999) argue that monopoly practices might be a barrier to development in poor countries. They note that in rich countries, say Canada, unions might be constrained by competition from other countries, such as the United States. Unions played an important role in the decline of manufacturing in the U.S. Rust Belt, according to Alder et al. (2017). Last, Dinlersoz et al. (2017) present evidence demonstrating that unions target young and profitable firms in certification elections, suggesting that unions explicitly set their sights on firms with extractable surpluses.

The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model. The model is fit to the data in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the main findings. It examines the union’s trade-off over effort, employment, and wages and relates this to some evidence on union negotiations in the mining industry. Section 5 presents a version of the model with a competitive labor market. This version of the model performs distinctly worse than the baseline framework where rents accrue from
mining. Section 6 studies deviations in modeling assumptions about bargaining between the union and firm. A discussion about why the model is relevant for some other episodes in U.S. history is presented in Section 7. With a little imagination, the model presented could be adapted to analyze the case studies reviewed in this section. Section 8 concludes.

2. THE MODEL

Schmitz’s (2005) case study is about a specific industry, to wit, iron ore. So, a partial equilibrium model, with some features particular to the iron-ore industry, is developed. Consider an industry where there is a monopoly firm and a single union. All workers in the firm are identical and are unions members. Decisions are the outcomes of negotiations between the firm and the union.

2.1. The Firm. The firm produces gross output using a constant-returns-to-scale technology that employs capital, labor, and materials. In particular, the production process is described by

\[ y = \min\{F m^n k^{1-\gamma-v}, f/\phi\}, \quad \text{with } 0 \leq \gamma, v, \gamma + v \leq 1. \]

Here \( y \) is gross output, \( k \) denotes the stock of capital, \( l \) represents the services of labor, and \( m \) and \( f \) are the inputs of materials. Observe that the first type of material input, \( m \), is allowed to substitute in standard fashion with the other inputs in response to changes in prices. For example, when labor is expensive, the firm might use better materials and supplies to cut back on the workers used in maintenance and repairs. The second type of materials, \( f \), is inputs that simply must be used in fixed proportion with gross output. Bentonite and the lumber used for shafting might be such examples. Bentonite is used as a binder for creating iron-ore pellets from the processed iron ore that derives from finely crushed taconite rock. These inputs are proportional to scale of the mining operation. Materials are an important factor in the production of gross output in the iron-ore industry. So they are included in the above production function. The introduction of two types of materials serves to capture the fact that materials’ share of income is large and relatively constant in the iron-ore industry, which is important for the calibration strategy.³ By normalizing the price of \( f \), relative to output, to 1, the above formulation is equivalent to⁴

\[ \hat{y} = (1 - \phi) l^n m^n k^{1-\gamma-v}, \]

where \( \hat{y} \) is output net of the payment to the second type of material. The part of materials used in fixed proportion with gross output effectively operates to reduce profits, as reflected by term \( 1 - \phi \). There is no technological progress in production. In the spirit of Schmitz (2005), who documents that the rise in productivity is not due to either low-productivity mines closing or existing mines reducing their scale, a decreasing-returns-to-scale production function is not used here.⁵

Labor services, \( l \), are a function of both the number of workers, or bodies, \( b \), and a worker’s effort level, \( e \). Specifically, \( l \) is described by the Cobb–Douglas aggregator

\[ l = b^\eta e^{1-\eta}, \quad \text{with } 0 \leq \eta \leq 1. \]

³ Given that the market modeled is not competitive, there are rents accruing from production. One implication is that a factor’s share of income is not a constant fraction of sales, as it would be under competition with just the variable type of materials, \( m \). The materials used in fixed proportions, \( f \), serve two purposes. First, they reduce the amount of economic profit the union can take, which helps the model match both labor and material shares of sales. They also lend a hand in keeping materials’ share of sales constant in face of changes in rents. The role of \( \phi \) is discussed further in Section 3.

⁴ This is identical to the Cobb–Douglas production function used in Schmitz (2005), except that \( l \) represents labor services as opposed to hours hired, which is discussed next.

⁵ Diminishing returns to scale creates a force for productivity to increase whenever production decreases. To see this, think about the production function \( y = \nu^r \), where \( 0 < \gamma < 1 \). Here productivity would be given by \( \nu^{r-1} \), which increases whenever labor falls. Again, Schmitz (2005) argues that such a mechanism cannot explain the data.
where \( \eta \) controls the relative importance of bodies in production. Bodies and effort are not perfectly substitutable in production. It is easy to think of certain tasks that might optimally call for multiple employees but could, in principle, be done by just one person. Imagine a person working on a ladder. It may be feasible for him to climb up and down to get various parts and tools, but it might be more efficient to have someone else pass them to him. Having people working at full steam may cause carelessness, resulting in poor quality control or injuries—see the Conclusion section for a further discussion on this. Aircraft controllers generally work for less than two hours at a time because of the high levels of concentration required. They then take liberal breaks (up to 45 minutes) to ensure that they are appropriately rested. On the other hand, coordinating, housing, and training large numbers of workers, each exerting little effort, may be problematic.\(^6\)

The monopolist faces an inverse demand function:

\[
p = \sqrt{\delta/y}. \tag{3}
\]

Here \( y \) is the firm’s gross output, \( p \) is the price of output, and \( \delta \) is a demand parameter. Denote union wages by \( w \), the price of variable materials by \( q \), and the rental rate on capital by \( r \). The firm’s profits, \( \pi \), can be expressed as

\[
\pi = \Pi(w, b, e, m, k) \equiv \sqrt{\delta y} - wb - rk -qm - pf \tag{4}
\]

\[
= (1 - \phi)\sqrt{\delta y} - wb - rk -qm.
\]

Since \( r \) and \( q \) are fixed in the analysis they are suppressed in the function \( \Pi \). In what follows, a drop in the demand parameter from \( \delta \) to \( \delta' \) will be taken to reflect the increased competition that the American and Canadian iron-ore industries faced from the introduction of Brazilian iron ore. This will be the only source of exogenous change.

\[2.2. \text{The Worker.} \] Workers have preferences over wages, \( w \), and the exertion of effort \( e \). Preferences are assumed to take the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form shown below:

\[
U(w, 1 - e) = \left[ \frac{w^\rho}{2} + (1 - e)^\rho /2 \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}, \quad \text{with } \rho \leq 1. \tag{5}
\]

The parameter \( \rho \) governs the elasticity of substitution between wages, \( w \), and rest, \( 1 - e \).\(^7\) Wages represent consumption. Rest, \( 1 - e \), is the total amount of energy that a worker has, which is normalized to 1, less what he expends in effort, \( e \).

\[2.3. \text{The Union.} \] There is a union that negotiates on behalf of the workers. It has CES preferences over membership (or bodies), \( b \), and a member’s utility, \( U(w, 1 - e) \):

\[
W(w, 1 - e, b) = \left[ U(w, 1 - e)^\tau /2 + b^{\tau} /2 \right]^{\frac{1}{\tau}}, \quad \text{with } \tau \leq 1, \tag{6}
\]

where \( \tau \) captures the elasticity of substitution.\(^8\) It is reasonable to assume that the union cares about the utility of its workers. Unions might care about the size of their membership, \( b \), for

\[^6\] Leamer (1999) analyzes a model of international trade where effort enters multiplicatively in production, instead of in a Cobb–Douglas fashion. He finds that effort levels, which are very similar to TFP levels in his model, help explain the wage premium in capital-intensive industries, as effort increases the returns to capital, and effort must be compensated with higher wages.

\[^7\] An alternative specification would allow for more general relative weights on wages and rest in the utility function. The results are robust to assuming a wide variety of relative weights.

\[^8\] Equation (6) is fairly flexible about specifying how the union should value employment. For instance, when \( \tau = 0 \) it says that the union simply cares about the number of members times the utility each member earns. The nature of this trade-off is pinned down by the calibration procedure in Section 3 and is discussed further in Section 4.
various reasons. Perhaps they are egalitarian in nature and want as many people as possible to realize some common living standard. Or perhaps it is easier to enforce a picket line with a large membership. For example, the innovation of a sit-down strike by the United Auto Workers at GM in 1936 prevented management and replacement workers from entering a Cleveland plant and resuming production. Another possible reason for these preferences is that a higher union membership offers economies of scale and/or allows union leaders to extract more rents for themselves. For instance, Northrup (1989) documents how the Cement, Lime, Gypsum, and Allied Workers Union, representing workers in the cement and related industries, could not be sustained after membership dropped in the early 1980s. The cost of the union, in terms of supporting the union staff, was large and became dispersed among fewer and fewer workers. Eventually, local branches spun off from the main union. Each individual branch had less power to fight management, and so the deals unions negotiated became worse. How the union trades off employment, rest, and wages is discussed further in Section 4; this section also relates these preferences to the record on union negotiations in the mining industry. Last, the worker does not care about the size of the union’s membership. Hence, the worker’s and the union’s objectives are not fully synchronized.

2.4. Bargaining. To determine employment, effort, and wages, the firm and union engage in Nash bargaining; the model without a union is presented in Section 5 and other modes of interaction between the firm and the union are entertained in Section 6. The firm and union have equal bargaining power. The surplus they bargain over is the amount of economic profit that the monopolist can create. Assume that the threat point for each party is shutting down operations, with the firm stopping production or the union going on strike. Recall that profits, $\Pi$, are given by Equation (4) and union welfare, $W$, is specified by Equation (6). Given these functional forms, the utilities for the worker and union are bounded below by zero. The threat points are therefore zero. The Nash bargaining process is described by

$$(7) \quad (w, b, e, m, k) = \arg \max_{w, b, e, m, k} [\Pi(w, b, e, m, k) \times W(w, 1 - e, b)].$$

The negotiated wage rate, $w$, is worker’s compensation for supplying his body at the effort level $e$. The form of this bargaining problem implies that the firm will earn strictly positive profits.

Bargaining between the firm and the union is efficient in the sense that one party cannot do better without hurting the other one. Still, from a societal perspective, things might be better without the union. First, the bargaining process exploits the fact that the firm has market power in the iron-ore business. The firm and union share the resulting monopoly profits. Second, the union places a value on high levels of employment (featherbedding) in the iron-ore industry that might not be beneficial for either union members or the economy as a whole. The union uses some of the surplus it extracts to increase employment and lower the amount of on-the-job effort required by union members. The extra workers could be better used elsewhere with union members putting in more effort on the job.\(^9\)

The main idea is that any monopoly profits are shared by the firm and union. Suppose that profits fall, say as demand decreases or competition increases, as modeled by a drop in the demand parameter from $\delta$ to $\delta'$. As a consequence, there are less economic profits to be shared between the firm and union. How will the firm and union react? Even though the model is relatively simple, it is not possible to obtain a tractable analytical solution. So, the model will now be solved numerically. The structure of demand, production, the worker’s tastes over consumption and rest, and the union’s preferences over the worker’s utility and the size of its membership all play an important role here. The calibration procedure, discussed next, pins down the precise nature of demand, tastes, and technology.

\(^9\) The fact that the firm is a monopoly implies that too little iron ore is produced in the economy. So, on this account, there may be too little labor services in the iron-ore sector.
3. CALIBRATION

From the outset, it should be said that, by its case study nature, Schmitz’s (2005) analysis is limited to a single industry (iron ore), in a single region (North America), for a short time period (the 1980s). To address Schmitz’s case study, the partial equilibrium model of the iron-ore industry developed above is now taken to the data. The exogenous parameters in the model are the rental price of capital, \( r \), the price of variable materials, \( q \), and the level of demand as determined by \( \delta \). These are exogenously determined outside of the industry. As was discussed earlier, the increase in competition from the introduction of Brazilian iron ore is modeled by a downward shift in the demand parameters from \( \delta \) to \( \delta' < \delta \). Specifically, demand falls, as represented by a drop in \( \delta \). The endogenous variables in the analysis react instantaneously to this sole exogenous shock.

The available data are very limited. Given the uniqueness of Schmitz’s study, it is difficult to find relevant parameter values from other sources. The model is fit to a limited set of statistics from Canadian data. The choice of Canada over the United States is due to the greater availability of data, such as TFP. The industries in the two countries reflect each other’s experiences closely. There are 10 parameters to be picked, \( r, q, \gamma, \rho, \tau, \eta, \delta, \delta', \phi, \) and \( \nu \). Some are imposed and others are calibrated so that the model fits the data; This is discussed below.

The calibration strategy focuses on two periods in the data, pre- and postcrisis. The year 1981 is taken to reflect the precrisis era. The postcrisis era is an average of the years from 1986 to 1990. The year 1981 is chosen as the precrisis year since this is when the data begin. An average of the years 1986 to 1990 is computed to smooth out the volatility in the postcrisis data.

Productivity and TFP in the model are measured in the same way as by Schmitz (2005). In particular, Schmitz (2005, equation 2) assumes that output is a Cobb–Douglas function of TFP, capital, labor, and materials. Thus, measured productivity and TFP are

\[
\text{PROD} \equiv \frac{y}{b} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{TFP} = \frac{y}{b^m \tilde{m}^k \tilde{\gamma}^{1-\tilde{\gamma} - \tilde{\nu}}},
\]

where \( \tilde{m} \equiv m + \phi y \) is the input of materials, \( \tilde{\gamma} \equiv (wb)/(py) \) is labor’s share of income, and likewise \( \tilde{\nu} \equiv (qm + p\phi y)/(py) \) is materials’ share of income. These statistics are computed in a similar manner for the data. Finally, any changes in measured productivity and TFP in the analysis cannot be explained by technological progress. This channel has been deliberately shut down in the model to emphasize the role that unions play in determining productivity.\(^{10}\)

3.1. Parameters Set Independently. Three parameters are chosen outside of the calibration routine, namely \( r, q, \) and \( \delta \). The rental rate on capital, \( r \), is set at 10%, reflecting an 8% depreciation rate in this industry together with a 2% net interest rate. The price of variable materials, \( q \), is normalized to be 1, an innocuous assumption. The parameter \( \delta \) controls the level of demand, which is important for monopoly profits. As the firm is a monopoly, this parameter governs the amount of economic profits that can be generated. The initial level for this parameter is set to 1.\(^{11}\) The Canadian data are then used to determine how the level of demand shifts with the crisis, as reflected by a movement from \( \delta \) down to \( \delta' \).

3.2. Parameters Set by Matching Moments. The remaining parameters are picked to match moments in the data. For the calibration exercise, there are seven parameters values to select, \( \gamma, \rho, \tau, \eta, \delta', \phi, \) and \( \nu \), and there are eight targets in the data. The

\(^{10}\) For evidence that technological progress did not play a significant role in productivity gains, see Schmitz (2005, section 4, parts C and D).

\(^{11}\) The choice of the initial value for \( \delta \) does not affect the results. As can be seen from Equation (4), choosing \( \delta \) is similar to choosing an initial level of TFP; hence, it effectively amounts to choosing the units that output is measured in.
seven parameter values in question are chosen using a minimum distance estimation routine. Thus, the seven parameters values are simultaneously determined in a nonlinear manner to minimize the distance between the data targets and the model’s analogues for these targets. Given this methodology, the selection of a particular parameter value cannot be associated with a particular data target. By computing the Jacobian of the model's output with respect to the parameter values, however, the influence of each parameter on the various data targets can be gauged. This Jacobian is presented in Table A1. A heuristic discussion of identification, based on this Jacobian, is now conducted.

Not surprisingly, the exponent on labor services in the production function, or $\gamma$, plays a major role underpinning labor’s share of income. It is also important for determining the change in output, productivity, and TFP. The more important labor is in production, the more surplus the union can seize. This is reflected in higher employment, lower effort, and higher wages. This implies that following the crisis, one should see larger gains in productivity, TFP, and output. The exponent on materials, $\nu$, in the production function primarily affects materials’ share of income; its influence on the other targets is modest. Likewise, the parameter $\phi$, which governs the part of materials that must be used in fixed proportion with output, also has a large positive impact on materials’ share of income (and consequently a negative one on labor’s share). But, as can be seen from Equation (4), this parameter also regulates the profitability of the firm’s production. The bigger this parameter is, the smaller is the surplus that the union can bargain for. In particular, it reduces the union’s ability to featherbed or to hire excess workers. Hence, the greater this parameter is, the smaller will be the change in TFP. The parameter $\eta$ denotes the exponent of bodies in labor services. The larger this parameter is, the more important bodies are. This will tend to raise employment. The impact of this parameter is moderate in nature. The increase in productivity and TFP is moderated somewhat, because bodies are more important in production.

Wages and rest are Edgeworth–Pareto complements in the worker’s utility function since $\rho = -2.4$, which is less than zero. As $\rho$ falls, the marginal rate of substitution of rest for wages increases more (in percentage terms) in response to a (percentage) rise in the ratio of rest to wages. To enjoy consumption the worker needs rest, so to speak, and vice versa. Thus, any required reduction in utility should be spread out relatively evenly across rest and wages. This force makes it desirable for workers to decrease their rest, $1 - e$, in lock-step fashion with the decline in wages, $w$. Membership and worker utility are close to being Cobb–Douglas in the union’s utility function ($\tau = -0.05$). Raising this parameter value increases the substitutability between utility and employment in the union’s preferences. When this parameter is higher, the reduction in employment becomes smaller, whereas the drop in wages is bigger.

Last, not surprisingly, the parameter $\delta'$, which governs the drop in demand, has a large impact on the change in prices, employment, productivity, and TFP. Moving up this parameter value reduces the impact of the crisis. To conclude this section, the parameter values used in the analysis are listed in Table 1, whereas a complete list of data targets and their model counterparts is shown in Table 2.

4. FINDINGS

As can be seen in Table 2, the model matches the facts very well. Importantly, the model can replicate both the rise in labor productivity and measured TFP. This is due to two factors. First, there is a dramatic reduction in featherbedding, or a dramatic reduction in $b$. Second, there is an increase in effort, $e$, by union members. This is significant because all of the inputs, but for

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12 Two goods are Edgeworth–Pareto complements if an increase in one of them raises the marginal utility of the other. Leisure goods are thought of as being strong Edgeworth–Pareto complements. To enjoy books, video games, and TV you must spend a lot of time with them. Greenwood and Vandenbroucke (2008) show how Edgeworth–Pareto complementarity can generate an increase in leisure over time. Kopecky (2011) uses the notion to analyze the rise in the fraction of life spent retired.
effort, drop following the crisis. Therefore, there is a large increase in ratio of effort to the other inputs. For example, the ratio of effort to bodies multiplies by 1.89. As a measure of capital utilization, consider the ratio of effective labor to capital or \( \frac{l}{k} \), where \( l \) is given by Equation (2). This jumps up by the multiple 2.28. Consequently, in the postcrisis situation capital is being used much more efficiently in the sense that each unit of capital has more effective labor devoted to it. So, capital is less idle after the crisis. An alternative measure of capital utilization is the amount of effort expended per machine that each worker can operate, or \( \frac{e}{(k/b)} \). This increases by a factor of 1.27. Therefore, each unit of capital per worker is being worked harder.

The model mirrors the decline in bodies (employment) and wages quite well. It also is able to mimic the change in prices and output. Importantly, it does this while doing a reasonable job matching (the level of) labor’s share of income. This is crucial, given the centrality of labor in the proposed mechanism. Had labor’s share been substantially larger (smaller) than the target, the model would have had an easier (harder) time replicating the observed productivity changes. Materials’ share of income is reproduced reasonably well by the model as well.

To get a grasp on how the union trades off employment, rest, and wages in response to the crisis, some equivalent variations are reported in Table 3. The superscripts 1 and 2 attached to a variable refer to the precrisis and postcrisis situations, respectively. Thus, for example, \( W^2 \) represents the union’s level of welfare in the postcrisis era. The union clearly values employment. To see that the union values employment, one could ask what fraction, \( 1 - v \), of the postcrisis wage/rest bundle, or \( (w^2, 1 - e^2) \), would the union be willing to give up to obtain the precrisis level of employment, \( b^1 \). As can be seen from row 1, the union is willing to sacrifice 39% of the wage/rest bundle, a large fraction. This clearly shows that the union’s and the worker’s objectives are not fully in accord; that is, the union is willing to sell out the worker to obtain the precrisis level of employment, which a worker does not care about. Alternatively, the union is willing to surrender 22% of postcrisis employment, \( b^2 \), in exchange for the precrisis wage/rest
## Table 3

### Equivalent Variations and Marginal Rates of Substitution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equivalent variations, v</th>
<th>Marginal rates of substitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( W((1 - v) \times w^2, (1 - v) \times (1 - e^2), b^1) = W^2 )</td>
<td>( \frac{b}{w} \times \frac{d w}{d b} ) at ( W = W^2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( W(w^1, 1 - e^1, (1 - v) \times b^2) = W^2 )</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( W(w^1, 1 - e^1, (1 - v) \times b^2) = W^2 )</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( W(w^2, 1 - e^1, (1 - v) \times b^2) = W^2 )</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( W(w^2, 1 - e^1, (1 - v) \times b^2) = W^2 )</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \frac{b}{(1 - e)} \times \frac{d (1 - e)}{d b} ) at ( W = W^2 )</td>
<td>7.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

bundle, \((w^1, 1 - e^1)\), as row 2 illustrates. Probing a little deeper, the union would exchange 20% of postcrisis employment, \( b^2 \), for the precrisis level of wages, \( w^1 \), holding fixed rest at its postcrisis level, \( 1 - e^2 \), as reported in row 3. But when keeping wages at the postcrisis level, \( w^2 \), the union would only forfeit 2% of postcrisis employment, \( b^2 \), for the precrisis rest level, \( 1 - e^1 \), as row 4 shows.

A similar conclusion obtains by looking at marginal rates of substitution for the union. Row 5 reports the union’s marginal rate of substitution of bodies for wages at the postcrisis equilibrium, whereas row 6 gives the marginal rate of substitution of bodies for rest. These marginal rates of substitution are reported in proportional terms to render them unit free. As can been seen, the union is much more willing to substitute bodies for rest (7.72) than bodies for wages (0.93). All of this suggests the union is willing to sacrifice workers’ rest to minimize the drop in employment and workers’ wages. The drop in rest is operationalized in practice by changing workplace rules. Some evidence on the union’s trade-off between employment and effort (workplace rules) is presented next.

### 4.1. Evidence on the Union’s Objectives

A report by PaineWebber (1987, pp. 1–51) attributed the increase in Minnesota mining labor productivity to factors such as (i) increased flexibility in job classifications, (ii) grouping vacations so that plants are only temporarily shut down, (iii) changes in work assignments, (iv) increased pace of work by labor and management, and (v) rationalizing plant maintenance and repair. For example, negotiated union work practices dictated that when a machine broke down workers had to stand by idly until a union designated repair man came by, even when a simple fix might work. More flexible work practices, which allow the regular workforce to do minor repairs and servicing, reduce such delay. The original workplace rules must have resulted in overstaffing or union featherbedding.

That the union cared about employment and workers’ effort can be seen in the negotiations between the United States Steel Corporation and the United Steelworkers of America, Local Union 1938 representing Minntac, one of Minnesota’s largest iron-ore facilities. One area of dispute, resolved through arbitration in June 1987, was where shifts of workers would relieve one another. Before the crisis, a working shift left the mine before a relieving shift entered. This was clearly a productivity-killing practice since it left the workplace idle during the change in shifts. The company demanded “eyeball-to-eyeball” relief, in which the relieving shift would switch out the working shift inside the mine, allowing workers to continue on the job until their replacements showed up. The union objected to this change in practice as it would “extend the workday,” increasing worker effort. The company was willing to treat the extra time required for workers to “return to the dry” as paid time, supporting the notion of a compensating differential. Thus, the union indeed cared about workers’ effort, probably for two reasons. First, workers, and hence unions, directly care about effort, as specified by Equations (5) and (6). Second, the union indirectly cares about the level of effort expended by workers because this affects

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13 For a discussion about how changes in workplace practices affected productivity in mining, see Schmitz (2005, section 6).
employment. The change in relief practice was estimated in the arbitration to affect total labor input by the equivalent of four jobs, reflecting both the trade-off between bodies and effort, as assumed in Equation (2), and the union’s desire to add employment, as in Equation (6).\footnote{Source: Board of Arbitration Results, June 3, 1987, between United States Steel Corporation and United Steelworkers of America Local Union No. 1938. Jim Schmitz is thanked for sharing these records.}

Furthermore, the details of these contracts imply that effort could be monitored well. Just as “eyeball-to-eyeball” relief, break times were highly regulated. For instance, National Steel Pellet and the United Steelworkers of America Local Union 2660 formalized three daily breaks in their 1994 agreement. The “morning coffee break” was at 9:00 a.m. for 10 minutes. Lunch was for 20 minutes at noon. A 10-minute “clean-up” break was permitted at the end of the shift.\footnote{Source: The July 1, 1994, agreement between National Steel Pellet Company and the United Steelworkers of America Local Union 2660. Again, Jim Schmitz is thanked for sharing these records.} Typically, unionized establishments are “by the book” enterprises, with both management and unions separately monitoring the effort levels of workers. Separate monitoring by both parties is essential because disputes are handled through formalized arbitration and grievance procedures—see Freeman and Medoff (1984) for a discussion of the benefits of such procedures.

Many of the workplace rules were specifically designed to increase the number of jobs. On this point, after the crisis, the National Steel Pellet and United Steelworkers of America Local Union 2660’s 1994 contract greatly expanded the types of tasks workers were allowed to do.\footnote{This contract was a follow-up to previous negotiations, aimed at extending productivity gains already achieved.} The goal was that “(a)ll employees must accept more responsibility for their individual work performance so that, where possible, an employee can perform with limited or no supervision.” Indeed, the contract made it clear that tasks were no longer to be uniquely defined, and that people must be willing to be flexible. For instance, nine different types of workers, ranging from painters to welders, were now permitted to “change miscellaneous light bulbs incidental to work.” Additionally, many different types of craftsmen had various support, or “assist” groups that had been specific to them. The new contract made it clear that “((t)he craft assist provision does not mean craftsmen cannot work alone and it does not prevent electricians or carpenters from working with mechanical craftsmen. The craft assist provision does not constrain the craft overlap.” It seems likely that the previous rules had been in place to increase employment by creating unnecessary positions.\footnote{As before, the source is the agreement between National Steel Pellet Company and the United Steelworkers of America Local Union 2660, dated July 1, 1994.} This phenomenon was not unique to National Steel Pellet. The Minneapolis Star Tribune reported that “In 1981 [LTV Steel] had separate union job classifications for welders, mechanics, plumbers and pipe fitters. Now all those duties have been combined, with union cooperation, into the single job of millwright.”\footnote{“Taconite Is Back,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, January 8, 1996.}

5. THE MODEL WITH A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET

How important is the union for attaining the above results? To analyze this, consider the above framework with a competitive labor market instead. Now, firms are free to hire as many bodies, $b$, as they like and specify the level of effort, $e$, that a worker must provide. They must pay a worker a wage, $w$, that will guarantee the competitive level of utility, denoted by $U^*$. Thus, the firm must provide an effort/wage rate combination that satisfies $U(w, 1 - e) = U^*$. This equation implicitly defines a wage schedule that is a function of effort; that is, if the firm demands a higher level of effort, $e$, then it must pay a higher wage rate, $w$, that maintains the competitive level of utility, $U^*$, for a worker. As in the baseline model, the wage rate, $w$, is the income that the worker earns for supplying a body at effort level $e$. Thus, the equilibrium under study is given by the solution to the following problem for the firm:

$$\max_{w, b, e, m, k} \{\Pi(w, b, e, m, k), \quad \text{subject to } U(w, 1 - e) = U^*\},$$

where $\Pi(w, b, e, m, k)$ is defined in Equation (4).
The model is recalibrated under the competitive labor market scenario to attain the best overall fit with respect to the data—the new parameter values are presented and discussed in Appendix A.3. The upshot of this exercise is shown in Table 4. The competitive labor market framework does not fit the data nearly as well as the baseline Nash bargaining union model. First, the gains in productivity and TFP are much smaller, almost nonexistent. This is not surprising because the union in the baseline setting places value on having a high level of employment, $b$. When the labor market is competitive, the firm will choose $b$ to maximize profits. In contrast, featherbedding leads to excess employment in the union model. This makes it easier to shed bodies following the crisis in the union model vis-à-vis the one with a competitive labor market. Second, with a competitive labor market the firm has no scope to cut the utility that a worker gets from a job. In fact, to increase effort the firm must pay more. So, if the firm increases effort, $e$, to compensate for cutting employment, $b$, then it must raise wages, $w$. On this, note that wages (and hence effort) do not change in the competitive model, which is counterfactual. Third, since with a competitive labor market the firm cannot cut the utility that a worker receives, it must slash output more than in the union model. This occurs in spite of a smaller calibrated drop in demand, or a larger value for $\delta'$, relative to the baseline model. This latter fact results in an anemic price decline. All in all, the model with a competitive labor market performs distinctly worse than the baseline model.

6. ALTERNATIVE UNION PARADIGMS

Are the results sensitive to the union paradigm that is employed? The relationship between the firm and the union determines how workers are compensated. In the baseline setup, bargaining is efficient. This implies there is no money left on the table that could be divvied up between the firm and the union. Two alternative paradigms for the union are entertained. In the first framework, called “right to manage,” the firm and the union negotiate over the terms of employment, or $e$ and $w$. The firm is then free to set the level of employment it desires, $b$, so long as it abides by the negotiated employment contract. In a second paradigm, dubbed “monopoly union,” the union has monopoly power in the labor market. It dictates the terms of the employment contract, or $(e, w)$, to the firm. Once again, the firm is free to employ the amount, $b$, that it desires. In these alternative frameworks the union does not bargain over the level of employment, $b$, although it does care about this. As a result, other things equal, there is less featherbedding. Upon recalibration the first framework does well. The second one has a harder time matching the data.

19 The competitive level of utility, $U^*$, is taken to be the postcrisis level of utility in the Nash bargaining model at the recalibrated set of parameter values. The parameter $\tau$ is not used when computing the competitive labor market solution, so for the Nash bargaining solution $\tau$ is set at the value obtained earlier ($\tau = -0.05$). Presumably the precrisis level of utility would be above what would occur in a competitive labor market. Some limited experimentation indicated that the value used for $U^*$ did not matter much.
6.1. The Union in a Right-to-Manage Framework. As an alternative structure, consider a right-to-manage paradigm. In particular, suppose that the firm and the union bargain over effort, $e$, and wages, $w$, but that the firm is free to pick the levels of employment, $b$, capital, $k$, and materials, $m$, that it desires. Specifically, after negotiating with the union, the firm selects $b$, $k$, and $m$, while taking $e$ and $w$ as given, to solve the maximization problem shown below:

$$\max_{b,k,m} \{(1 - \phi)\sqrt{\delta y} - wb - rk - m\}. \tag{8}$$

Since the firm can set $b = k = m = 0$ in this maximization problem, profits will always be nonnegative. Express the firm’s optimal decision rules for bodies, $b$, capital, $k$, and materials, $m$ by $b = B(e, w)$, $k = K(e, w)$, and $m = M(e, w)$. The bargaining problem between the firm and the union now appears as

$$\max_{e,w} \left\{ \Pi(w, B(e, w), e, M(e, w), K(e, w)) \times W(w, 1 - e, B(e, w)) \right\}. \tag{b, m}$$

It is fruitful to compare this problem with problem (7). Observe how in the above problem bodies, $b$, capital, $k$, and materials, $m$, have been substituted out by using the decision rules that arise from the firm’s problem (8). The contract negotiations between the firm and union are over the terms of work, here effort, $e$, and wages, $w$. These negotiations take into account how the firm will subsequently hire its inputs.

The results for this model are shown in Table 5; the new parameter values associated with this framework are presented in Table A3. As can be seen, this model does well too. It has a harder time mimicking the observed decline in prices, because the calibrated drop in $\delta$ is smaller. In the right-to-manage framework, the union does not directly bargain over employment. It can indirectly influence employment through the negotiations on $e$ and $w$. This is an expensive way to influence employment, however, so the union substitutes toward achieving higher wages and lower effort for its members. That is, the right-to-manage model has lower employment, higher wages, and lower effort than the baseline model, other things equal.\(^{20}\) To match the decline in employment, the recalibration places more weight on bodies in production than the baseline model. Additionally, bodies and worker’s utility are more complementary in the union’s utility function. This works to ensure that bodies fall in step with the loss into worker’s utility, the latter due to a drop in wages and a rise in effort.\(^{21}\)

\(^{20}\) That is, when using the parameter values for the baseline model, the right-to-manage model has lower employment, lower effort, and higher wages than the baseline model. This framework has to be recalibrated to generate the facts shown in Table 5.

\(^{21}\) In fact, a version of the right-to-manage model where the union does not care about employment has difficulty matching the data, even after it is recalibrated. So, having the union care about employment is important.
6.2. A Monopoly Union Framework. Another framework is the monopoly union paradigm. Once again, the firm is free to pick the levels of employment, $b$, capital, $k$, and materials, $m$, that maximize its profits. Now, the union chooses effort, $e$, and wages, $w$, to maximize its goals, as embodied in $W$, given the optimal decision rules of the firm. The union’s problem thus appears as

$$ \max_{e,w} W(w, 1 - e, B(e, w)), $$

where $b = B(e, w)$ is the firm’s decision rule for bodies that arises from problem (8). Here, as in Bridgman (2015), the union makes its decision in a unilateral fashion, while taking into account the firm’s demand for bodies.

The results for the monopoly union framework are presented in Table 6.22 This paradigm does distinctly worse than the Nash bargaining and right-to-manage frameworks. The union has considerable power in this setting. It uses this monopoly power to reduce effort and substantially increase wages.23 Unlike the bargaining frameworks, the firm’s profits are not a consideration when $e$ and $w$ are selected. Again, the union can only control employment indirectly, and this is expensive to do. So, the union prefers higher wages and less effort at the expense of lower employment. Following the crisis, effort moves up dramatically, as the union loses power. This is a necessary feature of the calibration if this model is to match both the large decline in bodies and the much smaller drop in output. Workers must be compensated for the huge rise in effort; hence wages do not fall, which is counterfactual. The monopoly union model also displays a smaller cut in prices. This occurs because $\delta$ falls by less in the new calibration.

7. APPLICATIONS TO OTHER INDUSTRIES

It is not hard to find examples where unions operating in monopolized industries have resulted in low productivity. Three such examples are discussed now. Since each example pertains to a specific industry, the model developed to study the iron-ore industry cannot be directly applied to the situations discussed. That is, each example would require its own case study to take account of the unique features of demand, production, and government regulations that characterized the industry over the time period of interest. That being said, it is easy to see that these examples share many of the considerations discussed above.

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22 The new parameter values associated with the recalibration are presented in Table A4.

23 This is at the parameter values for the baseline Nash bargaining model. The monopoly union model needs to be recalibrated to match Schmitz’s (2005) stylized facts. For example, at the baseline model’s parameter values, labor’s share of income is far too high in the monopoly union model.
Table 7

WAGES IN NEW ORLEANS—SHIPPING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Worker</th>
<th>Change in Wages, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton screwmen (docks)</td>
<td>−16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longshoremen (docks)</td>
<td>−20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight handlers (railroads)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. workers (all industries)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


7.1. **U.S. Shipping Industry.** The First Industrial Revolution brought railroads to the United States during the first part of the 19th century. Competition from railroads in the late 19th and early 20th centuries resulted in substantial changes in workplace rules in the U.S. shipping industry. Prior to competition from railroads, the U.S. shipping industry enjoyed monopoly status in part due to “holdup points.” At such points, a toll could be levied by a monopoly that all traffic had to pay. For example, a holdup point could occur where cargo had to be reloaded from (to) riverboats to (from) ocean-going vessels. There were also scale economies whereby it was not profitable for more than one shipper to service certain routes. Last, waterways were (and still are) heavily regulated, with foreign competition prohibited. Holmes and Schmitz (2001) document how this lack of competition resulted in high shipping prices, overly generous wages for dock workers, and extraordinarily expensive union initiation fees.24

Similar to the iron-ore case studied here, this lack of competition bred inefficient practices, instead of just high prices and wages. The dock workers union in New Orleans had workplace rules that lowered productivity, such as limits on how much work could be done on a shift, rules that required skilled workers to do unskilled tasks, and limits on the type of equipment that could be used. Competition from railroads reduced prices, prevented wage increases, reduced union fees, and increased productivity. Table 7 shows the change in wages from the 1880s to the 1900s in New Orleans, as railroads began to compete with shipping. Dockworkers suffered wage losses of 16%–20%, whereas freight handlers on railroads saw gains of 6.7%. This occurred during a period when average U.S. wages increased by 14%, showing the profound effect of competition on wages in the shipping sector. A model in spirit of that developed earlier could clearly match this experience.

7.2. **The Ohio Rubber-Tire Industry.** By the early 1930s, Akron had become the major center of tire production in the United States. Workers in Akron were well paid due to high productivity in the industry, which reflected a skilled workforce and external economies of scale. These external economies of scale arose from the fact that there were three very large firms located in a small area, implying a high concentration of specialized engineering, chemical, managerial, and brokerage services. Successful innovation was easy to mimic. In 1935 the United Rubber Workers (URW), an Akron-based union, formed. Sobel (1954) found that productivity growth slowed dramatically, leaving Akron much less productive than the rest of the country. Some of his facts are reproduced in Table 8. As can be seen, when the union was formed in 1935, value added per hour of work was 74% higher in Ohio than the rest of the country. By 1947, the rest of the country was now 8% more productive than Ohio.

Similar to the U.S. iron-ore industry, workplace rules and reduced effort played a central role in this productivity slow down. Sobel (1954) describes how unions were central in getting employees to “slow down” on the job and produce less.25 One such method of doing so was the introduction of the six-hour workday in Akron, but not elsewhere. Sobel (1954) notes

24 A dock worker had to work 333–500 hours to pay for the fee to join the union.
25 He also describes how these employees wanted to slow down even before the union, but were not able to coordinate.

Freeman and Medoff (1984) emphasize the “voice” that unions give workers so that they can obtain better working conditions.
that manufacturers preferred to add new employees, which involved additional training costs, instead of pay overtime. He (p. 19) relates that “(u)nion leadership is aware of the added disadvantage to Akron resulting from the six-hour day but has not stopped the practice for fear of creating additional unemployment.” The average workweek was much less in Ohio than elsewhere, as Table 8 illustrates. Wages were also increased by the union, even relative to the wage premium enjoyed before unionization. Using U.S. Census Bureau data for the period 1977 to 2007, Dinlersoz et al. (2017) examine the entire set of U.S. establishments. They find that unions tend to target the most productive firms for unionization. So, the damaging effects of unions apparently come after unionization.

The formation of the Akron union resulted in a “decentralization” of the tire industry. Prior to 1935 Akron had a large and growing market share in tire production, although afterward firms began producing elsewhere so as to avoid the union. Given the external economies of scale in Akron, this decentralization generated additional productivity losses. Although this particular mechanism was not prevalent in the iron-ore case, as iron-ore production is limited to where the mines are located, it generates an interesting further mechanism for exploration; in particular, a model developed along the lines in this article could be expanded to include a role for the location decision of firms. On this, Dinlersoz et al. (2017) document that union organizing activity is lower in right-to-work states.

The saga of the tire industry did not end with decentralization. Jeszeck (1986) argues that the U.S. industry was slow to produce radial tires, which perform better, last longer, and increase fuel efficiency relative to traditional bias ply tires. The oil shock of the 1970s led to a surge in imports of foreign tires as U.S. consumers looked to increase fuel efficiency. The URW quickly found itself unable to maintain unity, across dispersed factories, against management. The loss in the union’s power was reflected by the fact that of the nine tire plants constructed in the 1970s and early 1980s the URW could only organize one of them, compared with all 16 built in the 1960s. The increase in nonunion plants meant that firms could better weather the drops in output caused by work stoppages in the union plants, resulting in a loss of union bargaining power. Rubber workers’ wages stalled. Contracts the URW had made to limit the work week were undone, leading to the establishment of a seven-day continuous operation work schedule, despite opposition from workers. Jeszeck (1986) claims that continuous operations increased a plant’s capacity by somewhere between 16% and 40%. TFP growth, which had been stagnant at 1.1% per year over the 1958–73 period, soared to 3.5% from 1973 to 1986; see Litz and Moore (1989, table 1). The similarities with the U.S. iron-ore industry’s experience are striking.

7.3. U.S. Auto Industry. The reaction of the U.S. auto industry to foreign competition is discussed by Luria (1986), with a particular focus on how workplace rules and the classifications of jobs affected productivity. Luria (1986, p. 23) states that, initially, “[n]arrow definition of jobs, some of which could be assigned to less skilled workers, was management’s way of reducing the power of the skilled crafts. Ironically, workers now use the rules and job classifications to

### Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value added per man hour</th>
<th>Rubber (lbs) per man hour</th>
<th>Average Weekly Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ohio/Outside Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The data in Columns 2 and 3 are computed from the figures presented in tables 4 and 5 in Sobel (1954). Columns 4 and 5 are taken from table 8 in Sobel (1954).
preserve employment. The result is that unforeseen rigidities have been introduced into the organization of work.” For instance, until 1982, the rules required six types of workers to move parts from a delivery truck to the assembly line. That was reduced to one under the pressures of foreign competition. The U.S. auto industry was clearly an example of overstaffing due to low competition and union interference. With the advent of foreign competition, overstaffing was greatly reduced.

These examples are part of an evolving literature on the impact of competition on productivity. For example, Bloom et al. (2017) use the U.S. Census Bureau’s Management and Organizational Practices Survey, covering more than 30,000 plants across more than 10,000 U.S. firms, to study variations in management practices. They show that higher competition leads to better management practices. Of particular interest is that they also exploit the “right-to-work” status of states to compare management practices across 5,143 plants on different sides of state borders (within 50 km of the border). They find that right-to-work laws have a large impact on managers’ abilities to dismiss or promote workers based on the employees’ performances. Using U.S. Census Bureau data, instead of specific case studies, could facilitate a more general quantitative study (using a version of the model introduced here) that examines the impact of competition and unionization on the U.S. macroeconomy.

7.4. C. F. Martin & Company. Why would a firm agree to costly workplace rules that lower productivity and profits? The answer may be simple: Resistance is costly in the short run. Martin is an iconic name in acoustic guitars. They have been played by Gene Autry, Johnny Cash, Eric Clapton, Willie Nelson, Jimmy Page, Elvis Presley, and Neil Young, just to name a few musicians. In 1976, after roughly 140 years in business, Martin had its most productive year ever.26 Eighteen thousand guitars were made, or roughly 50 per day. The year after, Martin’s 195 hourly employees voted to join the Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers Local 552. The firm and union began talks on a contract. The company thought the workplace rules were too restrictive and refused to sign a contract. The workers went on strike in 1977. Salaried employees kept production going but it fell to six guitars a day. Chris Martin, son of the president, who was at college at the time but later became CEO, recalls “I would come home and someone would let the air out of my tires. My Dad got beat up. Some thugs came to his house one night and beat him up.” The strike dragged on for eight months and ended in 1978. About 120 workers quit the union and returned to work, whereas the other 75 were never rehired. Martin had to defend itself before the National Labor Relations Board against union charges that it refused to bargain and unlawfully shunned the union when workers crossed the picket line. The union was decertified. Martin has remained a nonunion shop till this day.

Holding out against unions is costly. Taschereau-Dumouchel (2015) argues that the mere threat of unionization causes firm behavior to change. In his analysis, the threat of unionization induces firms to overhire skilled workers, who are less likely to demand unionization, resulting in efficiency losses. Thus, he finds that the threat of unionization, even if not executed, still results in productivity losses. Holmes et al. (2012) suggest that monopolies may innovate less if adopting new technologies involves switchover disruptions in the form of temporarily lower output. Switchover disruptions are especially costly for monopolies because they will lose the high profit margins on the forgone output. They give a number of examples of switchover disruptions. These switchover disruptions may involve organizational changes, such as reductions in employment and modifications in workplace rules, which may meet with resistance from unions. Indeed, Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) document for the steel industry how opposition by workers, managers, and unions inhibited the adoption of productivity-improving changes in human resource management.

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8. CONCLUSION

It is reasonable to believe that workers and unions care about the amount of effort expended on jobs. In the early days, work on assembly lines was harsh. The day was long: nine hours or more. The work was alienating and monotonous. Conversation on the line was discouraged. Lunch breaks were short. Restroom visits were discouraged. The fast pace of the line, which was dictated by a machine, required a high amount of effort. This may have resulted in an unsafe workplace. In 1916 there were 200 severed fingers and more than 75,000 cuts, burns, and puncture wounds recorded in Ford’s Highland Park plant. As a result of all of this, daily absenteeism was said to exceed 10% and the annual turnover rate was 370%. This was costly to Ford. To reduce absenteeism and turnover, Ford instituted the Five Dollar Day. About one half of this wage was in the form of incentive pay, which could be withheld from workers with poor work habits or lifestyles. Work place practices may have originated to mitigate situations like these. Delimiting who does what, where, and when, and so forth, may be a way of regulating effort. Prohibiting piece rate scales and incentive pay are also ways to reduce effort. Any reduction in effort would have to be met by an increase in employment, at least if the firm desires to maintain its level of output. So, reducing effort also serves a union’s goal of increasing employment and membership. Thus, it is easy to understand how legitimate concerns about on-the-job safety and stressful working conditions could be hijacked by unions to further their objectives of expanding employment and membership. Some time ago, Kilbridge (1960) noted how the pace of work varied across industries, being high in clothing, electrical supplies, and rubber products and low in heavy chemicals, petroleum refining, and aluminum reduction, for example. Interestingly, he relates how the pace of work in an industry was positively associated with the degree of competition there.

James A. Schmitz (2005) documents the striking response of productivity, due to shifts in workplace rules, in response to increased competition in the iron-ore industry. A quantitative model of the interaction between a monopolist and a union is developed here that captures the basic elements of his case study. In the analysis, the monopolist cares about its profits whereas the union values both the size of its membership and the utility of its workers. The monopolist and the union bargain over how to split economic profits. If this bargaining is done efficiently, neither party will “leave money on the table.” Essentially, the monopolist and the union are divvying up economic profits between themselves in the most efficient manner possible. The rest of economy pays the price. The union uses its share of the economic profits to pursue its goals: reduced effort and higher wages for workers and more employment (or, equivalently, higher union membership). An individual worker may not care about the size of union membership, so the worker’s and union’s preferences may not be fully in tune with each other. When economic profits decrease, due to a rise in competition, the union is forced into accepting reduced staffing and increasing worker effort (relative to the other inputs), resulting in higher productivity. The mechanisms that allow for the model to match the data are explored. Key considerations in the analysis are (i) the union’s willingness to trade off membership and the welfare of its workers, (ii) the form of workers’ preferences over wages and on-the-job effort, and (iii) the ability to substitute effort and bodies in production. The model can match both the increase in labor productivity and the rise in TFP that are observed in the data.

A version of the model with a competitive labor market does not match as well the observed facts. There is no featherbedding with a competitive labor market, so it is harder to replicate the improvements in productivity and TFP that are displayed in the data. Additionally, when the terms of work are determined competitively, there is little scope for the firm to cut the terms of employment for workers. As a result, this version of the model fails to match the observed decline in wages. Since the employment package cannot be reduced, the firm must lower its output drastically. Likewise, a model where a monopoly union can dictate a worker’s employment package to the firm, while the firm hires the number of workers that it desires given this package, does not fit the data as well either. This framework has less featherbedding.
than the baseline union model because the union does not bargain over employment. The union uses its considerable monopoly power instead to attain higher wages and less effort than in the baseline model. This makes it harder to mimic the observed rise in TFP. Such a framework also has difficulty matching the decline in wages.

This work has been focused on rationalizing the finding’s of James A. Schmitz’s important study. The developed model could be modified to explain other episodes in U.S. history of increased competition leading to greater productivity, however, as is discussed. Indeed, the model presented here could form the basis of a research agenda studying the macroeconomic implications of low competition and unionization in various countries at various times.

APPENDIX

A.1. Data Sources. The data come from two sources. First, James A. Schmitz generously shared the data set for his case study; see his study for a detailed discussion of these data. Second, some data are taken from Statistics Canada. The data analysis in Schmitz (2005) is followed as much as possible, with a few exceptions. Data from Statistics Canada are used to compute the trend in pre-1980 real wage growth in the Iron Mines industry.27 When comparing the real wage change in this time series, relative to trend, with the real wage time series, relative to trend, in Schmitz (2005), the numbers are quite similar (changes of 20% and 25%, respectively). To construct the real wage, consumer price index data from Statistics Canada are used as well. The data on depreciation are from Statistics Canada. They are an average of the depreciation rates in the Iron Mines industry over the time period studied.

Labor’s and materials’ shares of income are also from James A. Schmitz’s data. These series are somewhat volatile but do not appear to have a significant trend. Again, two data periods are focused on: 1981 for the precrisis period and an average of 1986–90 for the postcrisis period. The yearly numbers here are not as important as the general magnitudes and the fact that they did not seem to change much over this time period.

A.2. Identification. The calibration procedure is nonlinear in nature. So, the seven parameters, namely, \( \rho, \eta, \tau, \delta', \gamma, \nu, \) and \( \phi \), are simultaneously determined as a joint function of the eight data targets. The local impact that a parameter has on the each of the data targets can be uncovered by computing the Jacobian of the model’s output with respect to the parameters in questions. This Jacobian is presented in Table A1, where the output is reported in elasticity terms. That is, it shows the percentage changes in the data targets for percentage changes in the parameters. These elasticities are multiplied by 100 for readability. A word is in order about how the moments are represented. TFP in the data rises by 42%. The target is represented here by \( \frac{\text{TFP}_{\text{Post}}}{\text{TFP}_{\text{Pre}}} = 1.42 \). The rows show the effect of a given parameter on each of the data targets. The columns illustrate how a particular data target is affected by each of the parameters. The heuristic discussion of identification in the main text is partially based on this Jacobian.

A.3. Competitive Labor Market. The values for the parameters that are recalibrated for the competitive labor market model are shown in Table A2. The parameter \( \tau \), which governs the degree of substitutability in the union’s tastes between utility and bodies, is not applicable here. It is replaced instead by the level of utility that occurs on a competitive labor market, \( U^* \).28 Observe that to match the large decline in employment, the competitive model must have a higher exponent on bodies, \( \eta \), than the baseline one. The drop in demand is less (as reflected by a higher value for \( \delta' \)).

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28 See Footnote 19.
A.4. **Alternative Union Models.**

A.4.1. *The union in a right-to-manage framework.* The recalibrated parameter values for the right-to-manage model are listed in Table A3. The weight on bodies in production, \( \eta \), is higher than in the baseline model. Additionally, the union’s preferences exhibit a higher degree of complementarity (or a lower value for \( \tau \)) between employment, \( b \), and worker’s utility, \( U \). This operates to ensure that employment will drop in step with a worker’s utility. The degree of substitutability between consumption and rest (or \( \rho \)) is a bit higher here than in the baseline model. This generates a better decline in wages when effort increases.

A.4.2. *The monopoly union framework.* The monopoly union framework has the parameter values, after a recalibration, shown in Table A4. The monopoly union model gives considerable power to the union. This leads to a dramatic increase in wages, other things equal. To get back to the observed value for labor’s share of income, the calibration routine selects a much lower exponent, \( \gamma \), on labor. To get employment, \( b \), to drop, along with a worker’s utility, \( U \), a higher degree of complementarity in the union’s tastes between bodies and a worker’s utility is needed.
A higher degree of complementarity in the worker’s utility function between consumption and rest allows for the latter to rise while preventing a counterfactual rise in wages.

REFERENCES


